1. Why I Read It
For years my picture of The Art of War was a handbook of stratagems: the success literature quoted again and again in training sessions, the book sliced into handy tips in business manuals. Opening the original, I found it far quieter than those uses, and far more serious.
Its first sentence stopped me. It does not talk of stratagem but of weight: war is a great matter of state. If a book sets its opening on “the ground of death and life”, nothing after it can be light.
Reading on, what surprised me more was its centre of gravity. The most famous of all books on war spends its time urging you not to fight: if you can avoid battle, avoid it, and if you must fight, finish quickly. It puts “not fighting” at the top — almost the reverse of what a book of war is imagined to be.
2. The Skeleton First
The Art of War runs to thirteen chapters, about six thousand characters (a little over six thousand in the standard text), long attributed to Sun Wu at the end of the Spring and Autumn period. It is short, but its tone is extremely restrained; there is almost no story, only verdicts. In 1972 a cache of bamboo slips was unearthed from a Han tomb at Yinqueshan in Shandong, among them a copy of The Art of War, differing here and there from the received text — and this is one starting point for how it is re-edited today.
The order of the thirteen chapters is itself like the course of a campaign. Set out as a table:
| Chapter | Contents |
|---|---|
| Estimates | The five factors and seven calculations; it opens on “war is a great matter of state” |
| Waging War | The cost of war; “victory is prized, not length of time” |
| Attack by Stratagem | “Subdue the enemy without fighting”, “know the enemy and know yourself” |
| Dispositions | First make yourself invincible, then wait for the enemy to be vincible |
| Energy | Momentum and measure; “meet the enemy with the orthodox, win with the surprise” |
| Weak and Strong | Make the enemy come to you; strike the weak, avoid the strong |
| Maneuvering | Profit and the indirect; “turn the indirect into the direct” |
| The Nine Changes | Various terrains, and “some orders from the ruler need not be obeyed” |
| The Army on the March | Encamping and reading the enemy’s signs |
| Terrain | Six kinds of ground; “know both enemy and self, and victory is not in doubt” |
| The Nine Situations | Nine predicaments; “put men in a fatal spot and they will survive” |
| Attack by Fire | The conditions for fire, and caution in war |
| Use of Spies | Five kinds of spy; the work ends here |
Expand: the lines I noted while reading (my own annotations)
- Estimates: “war is a great matter of state, the ground of death and life, the way of survival or ruin — it must be examined closely”
- Attack by Stratagem: “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the highest excellence”
- Dispositions: “first make yourself invincible, then wait for the enemy to be vincible”
- Energy: “in battle, meet the enemy with the orthodox and win with the surprise”
- Weak and Strong: “make the enemy come to you, and do not go to him”
- The Nine Situations: “put men in a fatal spot and they will survive; place them in a dead ground and they will live”
One warning: do not read it as a manual of ruthless cunning. It is about cost and odds — first work out whether you can win and whether you can afford it, and only then how to fight. Read as a set of tricks for manipulating people, and you have it exactly backwards.
3. Passages and Marginalia
On “weight”: the first line of the book
兵者,国之大事,死生之地,存亡之道,不可不察也。
— Chapter One, Estimates
My own working translation: War is a great matter of state — the ground of death and life, the way of survival or ruin — and it must be examined closely.
The opening says nothing of stratagem; it speaks of weight. Those four characters, “it must be examined closely”, fix the tone of the whole book: this is a thing to be weighed again and again, not a thing to be enjoyed in a rush.
笔记The much-quoted “war is a way of deception” also stands in this chapter, but directly after “it must be examined closely”. First it tells you not to be reckless, then it tells you how to mislead the enemy in battle — reverse the order and you have a different book.
On “the highest excellence”: a counter-intuitive claim
是故百战百胜,非善之善者也;不战而屈人之兵,善之善者也。
— Chapter Three, Attack by Stratagem
My own working translation: Hence to win a hundred battles out of a hundred is not the highest excellence; to make the enemy submit without fighting is the highest excellence.
着重点A hundred victories out of a hundred is not counted best here; to make the enemy yield without a battle is best. A book of war raising “not fighting” to the top is the least warlike thing about it.
My note: this line is usually taken as high moral sentiment, but it is thoroughly practical. A hundred victories out of a hundred means a hundred engagements, and every one of them costs lives and grain; to bring the enemy down without a fight saves precisely that. What it praises is not mercy but efficiency.
On “judgement”: a familiar old saying
知彼知己,百战不殆。
— Chapter Three, Attack by Stratagem
My own working translation: Know the enemy and know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will not be in danger.
These eight characters are so familiar that the original slips past. Note the order it insists on: “know the enemy” first, “know yourself” second — the hardest thing is to see through the other side, and the easiest thing to overlook is to see through yourself.
危险Notice it does not say “a hundred victories”, but “not in danger” — no defeat. The aim drops from winning to not losing, which is the book’s consistent caution: shut the door on defeat first, then talk about victory. And even here it only reaches “no danger”; to reach “certain victory” you must also “know Heaven and Earth”.
On “invincibility”: where the initiative comes from
昔之善战者,先为不可胜,以待敌之可胜。不可胜在己,可胜在敌。
— Chapter Four, Dispositions
My own working translation: Those skilled in war in the past first made themselves invincible, and then waited for the enemy to become vincible. Invincibility rests with oneself; vincibility rests with the enemy.
着重点What keeps you from being beaten lies with you; whether you can beat the other side depends on them. So it spends all its effort on the first part: patch your own holes first, then wait for the other side to open one.
My note: this is why it keeps returning to “defence”. Defence is not passivity; it hands the uncontrollable part over to time and grips the controllable part tightly. Waiting, too, is an action.
On the ending: it closes on spies
故惟明君贤将,能以上智为间者,必成大功。
— Chapter Thirteen, Use of Spies, the last chapter of the book
My own working translation: Hence only a wise ruler and a capable general who can use the most intelligent men as spies will achieve great results.
A book about waging war ends on intelligence. And it makes the use of spies sound momentous: to pay a high price for information is the thrifty way to fight; those who grudge that money often lose the whole war.
笔记Ending here is not a non sequitur. Having covered cost, odds, terrain and fire, it comes back to the most basic thing: how much your knowledge of the enemy is worth. It would rather spend money on information before the war than on bodies during it.
Why the thirteen chapters fall in this order
From first to last it walks a chain: first decide whether to fight at all (Estimates, Waging War), then look for ways to fight less (Attack by Stratagem), then how to stand undefeated (Dispositions), and only then how to fight (Energy, Weak and Strong, Maneuvering), followed by particular situations (the Nine Changes, on the March, Terrain, the Nine Situations, Attack by Fire), closing with intelligence. The course of a war is arranged as a decision process you could review afterwards1.
Before you start: two small things
One is the edition. Modern readers commonly use the Song text of the Eleven Commentators, or the version in the Seven Military Classics; after the Yinqueshan bamboo slips were unearthed in 1972, the textual differences between received and ancient copies were re-examined. When choosing, see whether the edition states which source text it follows. The other is method. It is almost all verdicts, with no story, and read quickly it looks like a book of maxims; read slowly, putting each sentence back into its chapter, and you see what question it is answering2.
4. What I Put to Use
- Work out the cost before you talk of victory. “Victory is prized, not length of time” does not urge haste; it warns that dragging on is itself a loss. The same applies off the battlefield: keep “winning” and “affording it” as separate sums, and many a needless fight cancels itself on the spot.
- First make yourself invincible. Before acting, ask: if this fails, what is the worst I lose, and can I hold that? Only if I can, go on to the next step. Treating “no defeat” as the part you control is a very usable rule.
- Make the enemy come to you, and do not go to him. Try to let the other side follow your rhythm instead of being dragged along by events. Even in a single conversation, decide first who sets the pace today, and the outcome changes.
5. Closing
Having read twenty-four pieces up to here, this is where the series ends. Looking back at the first, the Analects, I find the two books shaking hands at the same point: neither talks of luck, both talk of judgement — one teaches you to see a person clearly, the other to see a situation clearly; one says “do not impose on others what you would not want yourself”, the other “know the enemy and know yourself”. In the end it is the same thing: before you act, see clearly who stands opposite you.
From the Analects to The Art of War, the twenty-four readings differ, but together they amount to one habit: treating a book as a practice you can return to on the spot, again and again. Here it can close.
Footnotes
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On the order: the arrangement of the thirteen chapters need not come from Sun Wu alone; later editors may have had a hand. Read in the given order, however, and it does look like a chain of decisions running from “should we fight at all” to “how to fight”. ↩
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On “war is a way of deception”: this comes from the passage in Estimates that lists the ways of deception, and concerns feints and misdirection on the field. It is one small section, not the book’s thesis; the book’s position is nearer “win first, then seek battle”. ↩
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